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Peter Heather’s study of Western Europe after the fall of Rome comes in four parts, with the first three being similar, and the fourth different. Each one is about a separate attempt to restore ‘imperial’ rule to the Western Roman Empire.

Part one starts with the background of Theoderic, specifically his time as a hostage in Constantinople, and his exposure to Roman civilization. It moves onto Gothic politics, and does a good job looking at them, and how through a series of gambles, and deals, he ended up as the leader of a reduced, but cohesive group of Goths, and took on the job of expelling Odoacer from Italy. The resulting Ostrogothic Kingdom is shown as an attempted restoration of the Empire to Western territories. Despite later disagreements, Theoderic had started with orders from Constantinople, and his later effective control over Visigothic Kingdom in Gaul and Spain allowed him to dominate most of the Western Empire’s former territories, and the intent was purely to be seen as the Western Emperor.

The problem was the conjoined Gothic states did not stay so after Theoderic’s death, which leads to the second part, Justinian’s reconquest of substantial part of the Western Empire. Heather shows that Justinian attempted to legitimize his reign with a couple gambles, law reform and war with Persia, which did not work out. The expedition to Africa and invasion of Sicily were very opportunistic schemes to restore legitimacy. The eventual Justinian law code only went forward based on the political capital gained from success in the west, and the section ends with analysis of the idea that Justinian’s wars crippled the Eastern Empire in the long run, and generally comes up negative. I think he didn’t consider the impacts on manpower nearly enough, but economically, he’s on reasonably solid ground.

The third section is about Charlemagne’s crowning as Emperor in 800, and the subsequent collapse of the state over the next few generations. There’s some very good analysis in here about how the need to reward followers both allow a moderate sized state to grow quickly (when there’s plenty of rewards to give out), and forces it to come apart once that growth slows or stops. Each change in rulers requires a new round of payments to make sure of loyalties, and a few years to ‘feel out’ which members of the court are the most competent and loyal.

The common thread through the book is the idea how the Romans saw divine approval and power as intertwined. In Christian terms, if God wanted you to be Emperor, then no force on Earth could stop it, and if you were the Emperor, then obviously God wanted you to be so. And since the Emperor was chosen by God, then he had authority over the Church. The fourth section shows this being turned on its head.

Charlemagne’s administration produced a set of standard texts for education inside the Christian Church. There is a good discussion of the forgery of the Donation of Constantine, which claims the Western Empire was effectively handed over to the Pope in Rome. The idea presented here is that this was not a Roman (or Papal) forgery, but actually came out of the Carolingian churches. Until this point, the archbishops were the main authority, but if the (distant) Pope was the real head of things, then the bishops didn’t need to listen to the (nearby) archbishops. Then, a generation or two later, officials brought up in this tradition end up installed in Rome by German Emperors, and they worked to reform the Papacy into what they thought it should be, an ultimate source of ecclesiastical and temporal authority.

Trying to see this last as an ‘imperial’ project (so that it fits in with the rest of Heather’s theme) hurts this last part of the book. But overall, it is, like the other parts, an interesting look at the post-Roman/early Medieval West. Each part of the book interleaves with the rest, and while it is by no means a complete history of the period, it does a lot to examine just how the Western Empire did not manage to get reestablished.

In 91 BC, the Roman Republic found itself fighting a not-quite civil war, when a large part of Rome’s allies and conquered peoples in Italy rebelled and tried to bring down the Roman Republic. Cataclysm 90 BC is about this conflict, and several directly related subjects.

The “Cataclysm” name is justified in the first chapter with the idea of ‘cataclysmic adjustment’. This is an idea that if an unstable situation is left alone long enough, it will solve itself by turning into a different (generally more severe) problem. This is presented as a pre-existing concept, though I have not run into the phrase before, and while Matyszak is on solid ground in his assertion that the Social War was the opening act in the civil wars that brought about the Roman Empire, use of the word ‘cataclysm’ in the title still feels overly dramatic.

The subtitle ‘The Forgotten War that Almost Destroyed Rome’ is far more justified. As it happened, the two sides were fairly even for the first year or so, and it was quite possible that more of Italy would join the revolt against Rome, and Rome would fall. It might be worth wondering just what the Roman Republic would have been replaced with in such a situation? Likely, the various peoples involved would have tried going their own way, and return to the general situation before Rome dominated the peninsula. But they had just banded together to fight Rome, had adopted some of the forms of the Republic, and the actual cause of the conflict was a desire to be counted as Roman citizens. It is possible that some form of Italian Republic would have emerged, that would have explicitly included full rights for everyone involved, and gone on its business in much the same way as the Roman Republic—just without the Romans. Finally, it is very true that the Social War is not very well known. In popular knowledge, the period between the Punic Wars and Julius Caesar is silent. At the same time, it is somewhat ironic that the events covered here are also covered by two volumes of the fairly recent popular Masters of Rome series by Colleen McCullough, so it is not quite as forgotten as it has been.

Matyszak does a very good job of introducing the general situation, and showing the roots of the conflict. He takes a look at both sides, and shows how the recent history of the Republic had been rife with incompetence. This includes a rundown of reform attempts in the Republic, including the Gracchi brothers and Livius Drusus. The war is also handled well, and gives those details that are available, with appropriate asides about where sources are thin, or disagree. He also continues the narrative into the war between Marius and Sulla, and then Sulla’s campaign in Italy after the Mithradatic War and his attempt to reform the Republic. This is largely there as it follows on so naturally to the main subject, but the fact is that it also saw the last bits of the Social War play out (in further fighting against the Samnites, one of the prominent rebel tribes of the war).

This is a good short overview (only ~160 pages) of about a decade, and would only really benefit from perhaps some further reading suggestions and better maps. The one map provided is quite serviceable, but by no means exceptional. The editing seems fairly good with the only flub I noticed being Marius being introduced as ‘Caius Marius’ the first time, and then called ‘Gaius Marius’ for the rest of the book (both are correct; interestingly, he’s listed as Caius in the index). Speaking of Marius, Matyszak takes a dim view of him, seeing him as overly ambitious and jealous, and seems unconvinced of his military ability, in contrast to McCullough’s glowing depiction. As such, I wish he’d spent a bit more time on the man, because while he’s on solid ground with other historians on the first part, he is bucking the trend in his judgement of military ability.