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The subtitle “James K. Polk, the Mexican War and the Conquest of the American Continent” is on point. This primarily about Polk, and takes the view from the White House for the bulk of the book. After that in importance is the Mexican-American War, and then the dispute over Oregon.

I had initially expected more of a history of the Mexican-American War, but it’s really a political history of Polk. Which is an eminently sensible subject. I can remember him being pointed out in a high-school history textbook in what is usually a fairly ignored stretch. Polk came to office after an unexpected nomination, and had a very clear-cut list of major goals for the US, which he then proceeded to determinedly accomplish.

Merry starts out with background, giving a thumbnail of Polk’s early biography, and then more detail on his political background as a protege of Andrew Jackson. As a true dark horse candidate, the Democratic convention of 1844 is gone into with some detail along with the election, and then the selection of the cabinet.

Once in office, Polk is juggling several things at once, but Merry starts with concentrating on domestic issues, and then on the Oregon Territory dispute, leaving the Mexican-American War to be concentrated on in the later part of the book. All of this is largely told from the political point of view, so while what was going off in such far-off places as California and Veracruz is shown, it is done in sense of detail.

But, the point is to see how Polk went after his goals, and got them. His strategy with Britain and Oregon was one of close-mouthed brinkmanship. It worked, getting a good compromise solution, after scaring the rest of the cabinet with what seemed a likely war first. His reticence makes it much harder to figure out what his plans for Mexico were. It certainly looks to be the same modus operandi, just with an explicit threat of force by sending Zachary Taylor into disputed territory.

This turns into skirmishes, then a battle, and war. Generally, it was a war with popular support in the US, but the political fallout steadily erodes Polk’s influence in congress. This had started strong enough to help him pass his tariff act and other measures, but by the end of the war, ratifying a peace treaty was a very chancy thing. Merry’s evaluation of Mexico’s actions leading to war come rather later in the book, and generally this is one of the friendlier opinions of the US’s actions I’ve seen, but he is correct that Mexico did itself no favors. Of course, things were so unstable that I’m not sure I’d say there was a government you could negotiate with, but what there was refused to even talk. To one extent, it’s tempting to say that the proper course of action is to wait for a stable government, but there were no hints as to how long, if ever, that would take.

Also, the same process of American colonization-via-immigrants that happened in Texas was in the early stages of happening in California and Oregon, and if let drift would have ended about the same way. Polk certainly seemed to be willing to cut to the chase with a large cash payment that could also stabilize any government that accepted it (since it would let them pay troops and functionaries long enough to possibly get some momentum), but he was asking for more than anyone would accept. Worse than just not accepting this as a possible, much less good, idea, the Mexican government responded belligerently to all this. And so war came.

Through all of this is Secretary of State James Buchanan. I knew he was later a terrible president, but to plumb the depths, you need to look at his earlier career. Buchanan is a constant source of conflict with everyone else, and incapable of dropping an argument. After promising that he wasn’t seeking to be president himself, he starts maneuvering for a later nomination, and causes all sorts of extra problems and scandals. Polk’s main failing is that he has no desire for in-person confrontations, and never really brings the boom down on Buchanan, even after incidents where it was richly deserved.

Parts of this book were reasonably well known to me, but there was plenty here that was new. I certainly recommend this as an addition to any study of the Mexican-American War, as there’s a lot here. The writing is good, though the distant perspective sucks the life out of a lot of colorful figures.

Platt’s book is really about the relationship between Britain and China before the Opium War, and shows why a conflict was unexpected, almost right up to when it did happen.

The two had a stable trading relationship for about two centuries. While the very limited contact (all through Canton) seems repressive, in practice it did mean that everyone involved knew what to expect from each other, and how to keep the goods, and cash, flowing.

Instability arrived on the British side in the guise of opium. Notably, while official British trade stayed away from the substance, the East India Company was doing its best to control the sale of opium in India, and make a big profit from it. However, there was competition from areas not yet under control of the EIC, which led to them competing on price, driving the cost of opium in China down so that it was no longer just available to the rich.

On the Chinese side,  there were serious rebellions that sapped much of the available political will, as insane numbers of men and money were spent to put down the White Lotus rebellion, and right after dealing with the ever-growing problem of piracy. The ultimate cause of both is really that the population of China had doubled during the 1700s, while the tax structure meant no more money came in to oversee the greater needs of the greater population; this left the import tariffs claiming a more and more prominent place in the budget.

These combine to create ever-growing corruption in the Chinese government just as they have to deal with a new popular problem: An ever-growing number of people hooked on opium. (This also starts draining silver coinage out of China—historically extremely rare.) The Chinese go through a number of ideas on their war on drugs, including contemplating legalizing opium, before taking a very hard-line stance with a new administrator, who actually starts getting things done. Whether he was really doing enough to start stemming the tide, or just breaking up a couple waves is taken for granted here, but I have my doubts.

Either way, Lin Zexu ended up on a collision course with the latest British superintendent, Charles Elliot, as the EIC monopoly had just been ended (to the immediate benefit of opium smugglers). Elliot was months away from further instructions, did not have as much authority as he generally needed, and increasingly erratic under the strain. Collision was inevitable, and when it happened war followed.

Though the war itself was still not inevitable. Britain fought, on the surface at least, the abstract notions of honor and respect. That other motives lurked under the surface were obvious, and the effort to push the war through nearly caused top members of the government to be censured by Parliament, and may have led to a collapse of the Melborne government.

Overall, the book mostly sticks with the British side of things, partially, I believe, because the two British efforts to send embassies to China that form the beginning parts of the book are much better documented from that side (and still nearly gets stuck in the weeds of conflicting and incomplete accounts). Much of the middle is better on showing the internal challenges of China, but the figures involved never really come to life. The war itself is merely summarized, though Plat points out that the Chinese, operating with a much weaker miliary, didn’t play to its strengths either.