This is a 1925 book. I got it for cheap at one point through Diversion Books, but it’s available through Project Gutenberg as well. In fact, the latter appears to be in better shape, with proper linking to footnotes, which would have been good.
But the Diversion version came out a decade ago, it’s quite possible not everything had been done yet. I’ve certainly seen Gutenberg books get derailed by all the tagging for the original page breaks (though I just found a problem that persists in the Gutenberg edition—the only problem I’ve seen—of confusing “II” for “11” in a date). At any rate, it is currently available for free, and worth a look.
The purpose is to examine relations between the United and Confederate States and Great Britain, and examine the popular perception of Britain’s government leaning towards recognition of the Confederacy. As such, it is focused entirely on diplomacy, with instructions, notes, the differences between things said, and things officially said. The big events like the Trent affair are covered, but do not consume that much of the book, because they have been so well covered elsewhere, and the goal is to trace the day-to-day course and all the smaller actions not typically talked about.
It sounds dull, but Adams keeps it from actually being so. While diving into the weeds, a good pace is kept and actions and memoranda sweep on. The chapters are done by subject, but with a minimum of going back and forth in time, though it does happen. In fact happens most on a small scale, with a chapter, thanks to the speed of communications across the Atlantic.
The general opinion held is that the view of the British government was any rebellion as large as the South’s had, historically, won out in the end, and even if the North could somehow subdue them, the size of the army of occupation afterwards would be entirely impractical. This largely explains the feeling the Union generally had that the government was leaning towards recognizing the Confederacy as a separate government; they felt it was a done deal.
But there was a definite war on, and Great Britain adopted a neutral stance while the parties involved worked towards a solution. As the war drags on, the North seems no closer to getting anywhere (Britain, like so many others, mostly paid attention to the eastern theater), and the loss of life and property keeps growing, a desire to mediate between the sections is pressed. This reaches a climax in mid-1863 with a decided fight in the cabinet over what should be done (and then aftershocks in Parliament).
But Palmerston and Russel, while thinking there’s no hope for a restoration of the Union, understand quite well that mediation itself is a hopeless cause. Just a bare offer to do so would, at best, be empty air, and likely be resented by one or both. And there is no concrete proposal that could be put forth that would not be immediately rejected by one side or the other. Trying to force mediation would be equivalent to declaring war (de facto, if not de jure) and Britain is in no shape to take on a large country that is already on a wartime footing, no matter how distracted it is. All that can be done is wait for events to run their course and look for a time when defeat of the North is so apparent, hope in the war so low, that mediation could be started.
But no matter how bad things get, there’s still another Union success waiting to redeem the war effort, and that time never comes. The later parts do deal with the Alexandria and the Southern attempts to get popular support. The final chapter actually goes into popular support for the Union, and isn’t as well developed as the rest, but still fairly informative.
Generally, this is book for people who are already interested and generally knowledgeable about the ACW. This isn’t a place to begin studies. But it is, in it’s own way, still a general book, and an interesting one.
